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Plugging the Democracy Drain in the
Struggle for Universal Access to Safe
Drinking Water
TARA E. PAUL*
ABSTRACT

Privatizationof water delivery services has become a global trend as
states seek ways to shift both political and economic costs to private
actors. The advantage of privatization is that it relieves governments of
the dauntingexpense of repairingand expanding water infrastructurein
order to improve quality and reach marginalized communities. But
water privatization has also been deeply criticized for corrupt practices,
increasingprices to the poor, undermining human rights objectives, and
dodging accountability. This note aims to find middle ground,
acknowledging that privatization is an important tool to increase
freshwater access, but that treating water as a human right coupled with
a strong legal framework that fosters transparency,public participation,
and accountability will increase individual rights protections as well as
the chances for successful privatization projects. South Africa's
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act is offered as one example of how
administrativelaw can be used to harmonize these objectives.
INTRODUCTION
Clean and affordable water is often taken for granted, but not in the
minds of those who have experienced the want of it. Nearly one billion
people lack access to clean, drinkable water.' Every year approximately

* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A. California
State University, Fresno. I would like to thank Professors Christiana Ochoa and Robert
Fischman for their guidance throughout the writing and editing process, and the Indiana
Journal of Global Legal Studies staff for their help with preparation of this note. I am
especially grateful to my family for their love and support through law school.
1. See Water Facts, WATER.ORG, http://water.org/water-crisis/water-facts/water/ (last
visited Aug. 11, 2012) (listing 780 million people lack access to an "improved" water

source).
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3.4 million people die from water related illnesses. 2 In addition to these
profound implications for global health, lack of clean water and
sanitation is intimately linked to poverty. Millions of women and
children sacrifice precious time that could be spent in school or
generating household income, instead traveling long distances to collect
water that is often of low quality and unhealthy for drinking.
International organizations and non- governmental organizations
(NGOs) have responded with development plans like the Millennium
Development Project (MDP), a multi-national commitment to reduce
poverty through the advancement of eight social and economic
development goals." Such efforts have made access to water an
international priority.
Addressing the access to water problem is a global concern, as both
industrial and developing nations must develop strategies to effectively
and affordably provide clean water to citizens, especially the poor. Two
strategies in particular have emerged with a polarizing effect on the
international discussion concerning the global water crisis. The first
asserts that water should be treated as an economic commodity "to be
priced, marketed, and managed by the private sector."5 Proponents of
this strategy contend that the private sector has more expertise and
economic capital than the public sector and will therefore be more
efficient and capable of expanding to underserved communities.6 But
supporters of the second strategy maintain that water is a human right
under which all people must have access to clean fresh water in
sustainable and affordable quantities.7 Pointing to privatization
failures, these supporters reason that privatization creates
opportunities for corporate conglomerates to exploit debt-ridden
developing nations' resources and markets.8 Moreover, they argue that
water is a public good that should not be bought and sold according to

2. See Billions Daily Affected by Water Crisis, WATER.ORG, http://water.org/watercrisis/one-billion-affected (last visited Aug. 11, 2012) (listing as the cause of death
sanitation and hygiene-related causes).
3. Id.
4. See Millennium Development Goals, U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME,
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview/mdg-goals/mdg7/
(last visited
Dec. 2, 2011) (listing as accomplishments of the seventh goal of the MDP to improve
sustainability that access to water improvement has increased).
5. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water as a Public Commodity, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 17, 17
(2011).
6. Id. at 19.
7. Id. at 18.
8. Sarah I. Hale, Water Privatizationin the Philippines: The Need to Implement the
Human Right to Water, 15 PAC. RIM L & POL'Y J. 765, 768, 777 (2006).
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the market.9 Each of these theories is infused with different
implications for how water should be managed and who should manage
it. But both sides of the debate ignore the realities of many
less-developed nations and fail to recognize opportunities for
collaboration. O
Because water is an essential resource for human health and
prosperity, the struggle to bring clean water to nearly one billion people
and protect the health and development of marginalized groups are
strong reasons to adopt a human right to water. But it must be
recognized that privatization arguments also have merit. In developed
and developing countries alike, the public sector has underperformed
when it comes to providing water to all its citizens, and several common
factors have prompted policy changes in favor of privatization." First,
deteriorating water infrastructure is in need of repair and replacements
call for enormous capital investments that are impossible for local
governments to finance.1 2 Second, local governments are under political
and economic pressure to choose privatization because the financial
needs of the water sector are outstripping available domestic and
foreign aid.' 3 Third, financially stressed governments are seeking
private investment to increase access to clean water for underprovided
communities. 14 Finally, large water corporations have identified public
water systems as opportunities for enormous profits and aggressively
market their ability to make significant capital investments in
infrastructure and operate water services.15 In addition, international
financial institutions like the World Bank and the International
9. See generally DAVID A. McDONALD & GREG RUITERS,

Theorizing Water

Privatizationin Southern Africa, in THE AGE OF COMMODITY: WATER PRIVATIZATION IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA 13 (2005).
10. See generally MIGAI AKECH, PRIVATIZATION & DEMOCRACY IN EAST AFRICA: THE

PROMISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2009) (arguing that increasing accountability in the
privatization process will allow countries in East Africa to meet human rights obligations
while also leveraging much needed private investment).
11. Craig Anthony Arnold, Water Privatization Trends in the United States. Human
Rights, National Security, and Public Stewardship, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
REV. 785, 793 (2009).
12. Id. at 794 ("Estimates put the infrastructure investment needed in the US at
$140-250 billion in the next 20-30 years").
13. Violeta Petrova, Note, At the Frontiers of the Rush for Blue Gold: Water
Privatization and the Human Right to Water, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 577, 586 (2006)
(international financial institutions in particular).
14. Arnold, supra note 11, at 796-97 (ninety-three countries experienced privatization
in 2000, and many of the major multinational water service providers are operating in
more than 100 countries).
15. Id. at 797 (estimating the combined revenue potential of three of the largest
multinational water conglomerates-Veolia Environment, Suez Environment, and RWE
AG-at approximately $3 trillion).
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Monetary Fund (IMF) have pushed for increased private participation
and decentralization in water since the 1980s. 16 They have managed to
promote this vision
by conditioning development aid on privatization of
17
water systems.
Privatization has proven most successful when states remained
actively engaged with good governance mechanisms and regulations.18
Though the state is necessary to privatization, "[it] is not a self-acting
autonomous entity that inexorably acts with uniformity of purpose.
Instead, the state is a contested frontier, and different actors-internal
and external-all seek to influence how it works with a view to
maximizing benefits and minimizing losses."' 9 Capitulating to these
pressures can lead to hasty decisions with minimal opportunities for
public input and disastrous results for public health and government
budgets. There are good reasons to contract with the private sector, but
the treatment of water as a human right obligates states to ensure that
all citizens have access to clean water. Regardless of public or private
management, governments should protect human rights interests and
maintain regulatory authority to avoid a slip into laissez-faire policies
that accept market forces as a proxy for government regulation of such a
crucial resource.2 °
The purpose of this note is to demonstrate ways in which states can
improve the governance of privatization to secure a human right to
water through democratic accountability procedures. Procedures that
include public law principles of transparency, public participation, and
2
accountability foster citizen responsiveness to government decisions. '
Such procedures also offer avenues for citizens to participate in
decisions to privatize and require actors to answer for policy decisions
that are contrary to the public interest. This note argues that
administrative law reforms offer the means for both public and private
interests to be incorporated into legally binding procedures and thus,
endeavors to find middle ground in the water privatization debate and
offer a method for governments to protect human rights while also
courting the private sector.

16. See KAREN BAKKER, PRIVATIZING WATER: GOVERNANCE FAILURE AND THE WORLD'S

URBAN WATER CRISIS 72 (2010) (discussing the World Bank).
17. Arnold, supranote 11, at 796.
18. AKECH, supra note 10, at 17.
19. Id.
20. Hale, supra note 8, at 783; see Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization, Prisons,
Democracy, and Human Rights: The Need to Extend the Province of Administrative Law,
12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 511, 518 (2005) (discussing a desire to avoid making hard
political choices as a reason markets are allowed).
21. See Aman, supra note 20, at 516; AKECH, supra note 10, 31-33.
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Part I of this note will address the democracy drain, focusing on
ways in which privatization can displace stakeholders and preclude
citizen participation in policy making. Part II will elaborate on the
commoditization versus human rights approaches to water, arguing
that while there is room for private sector participation, a human right
to water is preferable as a foundation for citizens to insist on good
governance and accountability from state actors. This section will also
examine a selection of global experiences of privatization to demonstrate
the consequences when democratic accountability procedures are not
available. Part III will explain how public law principles of
transparency, public participation, and accountability can be employed
to plug the democracy drain. This section will also examine South
Africa's administrative law framework to demonstrate the potential for
administrative law reforms to give meaning to human rights by
applying public law principles to procedural requirements, applicable to
both public and private entities.

I. DESCRIBING THE DEMOCRACY DRAIN PROBLEM
The democracy drain in privatization of government resources
arises from the exclusion of stakeholders from economic policy decisions
that will have immediate effects on their rights and livelihoods.22 The
exclusion creates a gap between economic processes and citizen
participation, leading to an erosion of government accountability and
deregulation of markets.23 If governments take an increasingly
hands-off approach, those that favor market outcomes may fill the void
and regulate according to the rules of the market.2 4 When the role of the
market and international decision makers become too augmented, "the
public is no longer involved directly in decision-making, nor is
information available in a form that would make public participation
meaningful." 25 Without meaningful participation and transparency, both
public and 2private
actors are able to avoid difficult political questions
6
and choices.
Commoditization of a public resource reinforces the loss of
democracy, as market forces and market incentives become proxies for
the public interest. Commoditization of water, if coupled with
deregulation and minimal procedures for public input, may not only
negatively impact citizens' access to water, but also broader policy
22. See Aman, supranote 20, at 517.

23. See id. at 518.
24. Id.
25. Id.at 517.
26. Id. at 518.

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

20:1

decisions. Commoditization is essentially a policy decision that limits
the extent to which citizens will enjoy a certain benefit at the state's
expense.27 The shift in financial costs is also a shift in political costs,
allowing state actors to avoid tough political choices while private actors
implement market operations with limited political impunity.28 As a
result, commoditization can alter the agency relationship between
citizens and the state. The value of democratic governance lies in its
ability to foster legitimacy through public dialogue and processes. 29 It
calls for public participation in decision-making processes and seeks to
hold actors accountable for actions and policies that are contrary to
public will. 30 Thus, democratic governance can be a strong
accountability mechanism to balance market interests with individual
interests.31 At the heart of democratic governance are public32 law
elements of public participation, accountability, and transparency.
II. WATER AS A RIGHT, NOT A COMMODITY
Underlying the privatization debate is the question of whether
water can or should be treated as a commodity. Proponents of the
commodity position argue that water should be managed with efficiency
as the primary objective and that market forces will allocate resources
to the most productive use.33 They maintain that privatization is the
best means for reaching that goal because private entities are removed
from political pressures and desires for reelection and therefore they are
more likely to promote efficiency and minimize waste. 34 On the other
end of the spectrum is the human rights approach. Proponents of this
position argue that water must be managed with universal access to

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 525.
30. AKECH, supranote 10, at 31.
31. See generally Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: PrivatizingForeign Affairs
and the Problem of Accountability Under InternationalLaw, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135
(2005) (examining modes of accountability for private entities by examining the
contractual relationship between the private entity and a government).
32. Aman, supranote 20, at 525.
33. See Thompson, supra note 5, at 41 (examining how governments and markets can
work together); AKECH, supra note 10, at 3-4 (referring to how free market economic
theorists focus on efficiency as the goal in privatization).
34. See Jason Astle, Student Article, Between the Market and the Commons: Ensuring
the Right to Water in Rural Communities, 33 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 585, 586-87 (2005);
see also AKECH, supranote 10, at 3-4.
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clean drinking water as a primary objective,35 as privatization is
perceived to inhibit access, especially to the poor. Moreover, they
contend that water is a public good that must be managed by public
actors who can be held politically accountable. 36 Thus, while one
approach is concerned with efficiency, the other is concerned with access
and accountability. But these approaches are not necessarily
incompatible. Because water is central to livelihood, there are
significant risks to treating it as a commodity, but that does not
preclude a role for privatization. Instead, access to water should be an
enforceable right while states should consider private participation to
help achieve access for all citizens.
A. Consequences of Water as a Commodity
Commoditization of a resource occurs through "practice or policy
that promotes or treats a good or service as an article of commerce to be
bought, sold, or traded through market transactions."3 7 Generally, for a
good to be amenable to commoditization it must be excludable, such that
access is granted based on ability to pay, and it must be rival, such that
consumption by one individual effectively denies consumption by
another. 38 These characteristics make it possible to set competitive
prices and allow the good to be influenced by the market. By contrast,
something that is non-excludable and non-rival is resistant to
commoditization and is considered a public good.3 9
Water does not fit particularly well into either category.4 It is
difficult to describe it as excludable because its value is difficult to
ascertain. Water is necessary for human survival, but it has many other
uses also connected to human prosperity including religious practices,
recreational enjoyment, agriculture, and environmental conservation

35. See, e.g., U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006: BEYOND
SCARCITY: POWER, POVERTY AND THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS (2006), available at

http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR06-complete.pdf.
36. See, e.g., RECLAIMING PUBLIC WATER: ACHIEVEMENTS, STRUGGLES AND VISIONS FROM

AROUND THE WORLD (Bel6n BalanyA et al. eds., Beln Balanyi et al. trans., 2005), available at
http://www.tni.orglsites/www.tni.org/archivesbooks/publicwater.pdf
(providing an entire
collection of articles on arguing for shifting away from privatization to allow for public
accountability).
37. MCDONALD & RUITERS, supra note 9, at 20.
38. Id. at 20.
39. BAKKER, supra note 16, at 30 (using the examples that any consumption of water
means a rival use cannot occur and that consumption of water by one can reduce the
benefits, or exclude, to others).
40. See McDONALD & RUITERS, supra note 9, at 22 (reviewing different properties of
water and the markets around water).
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interests.41 Each of these important uses competes simultaneously for
water consumption. On the other hand, water can be described as rival
because it is a limited resource and one individual's consumption
necessarily impacts the quantity available for others. 2 Regardless of
these difficulties, the foundation for the treatment of water as a
lies in its economic value
commodity, particularly in urban areas,
43
created through the cost of providing it.
The provision of clean water requires purification, construction and
maintenance of an infrastructure for transportation, and delivery for
individual consumption." Each step in the process adds a cost to the
final product, and whether subsidized or charged the full price, a key
component to commoditization is that the primary value is the cost of
providing it.45 Once water is valued as a commodity, it loses its
properties as a public good and is transformed into "a scarce monetized
entity" subject to the same market forces as oil or gold. a6 Cost recovery,
efficiency in allocation and consumption, and profits become the
primary objectives in water management.4 7
There are two common components of the commoditization of water
that help reach these objectives. 48 First, full-cost pricing to customers is
used to recover the expense of providing water, but it is also an
incentive for customers to be cautious in their consumption. 49 Thus,
individuals are reluctant to use more water than necessary, and water
can be efficiently allocated among other competing interests.5 ° Second,
commoditization encourages participation from the private sector,
ultimately facilitating privatization through the transfer of state assets
to private hands and the formation of contractual relationships for the
5 1
construction, management, and operation of water infrastructure.
Because private companies are believed to be accountable to customers
41. Id. at 21; BAKKER, supra note 16, at 3.
42. BAKKER, supra note 16, at 30.
43. See Bruce Pardy, The Dark Irony of InternationalWater Rights, 28 PACE ENVTL. L.
REv. 907, 914 (2011) (examining the various costs associated with getting water to urban
areas).
44. Id.
45. See Thompson, supra note 5, at 24-25 (looking at commoditization as a way to
increase conservation).
46. MCDONALD & RUITERS, supra note 9, at 19.
47. Id. at 23.
48. See id. (reviewing the "corporatization" of water management).
49. See id. at 25-26 (discussing benefits of full-cost pricing).
50. See id. at 55-56 (describing how allocation can often be between companies willing
to pay and people who are not able to pay).
51. Id. at 23; See Thompson, supra note 5, at 28-29 (examining multiple countries that
have undergone this privatization, including Chile, Mexico, Morocco, and the United
Kingdom).
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rather than politics, proponents5 2 argue that the private sector is the
more efficient manager of water.
Despite the efficiency arguments, the commoditization of water has
also been deeply criticized. Although privatization typically leads to
increased access to water, it also almost always leads to significant
increases in water prices that disproportionately affect the poor.53
Additionally, critics worry that governments too frequently decide to
privatize "without proper regard to the prevailing political, social, and
economic conditions. 54
1. Pitfalls: Global Lessons from PrivatizationExperiences
Privatization of water delivery services in Cochabamba, Bolivia is a
prototype of the pitfalls of experiences with private sector management
of water utilities in developing countries. The Bolivian government
received aid form the World Bank to revamp its urban water systems,
and one of the conditions in the loan required Bolivia to reform those
systems through privatization.55 Following the commodity approach to
water, the World Bank believed that privatization could bring efficiency,
lower prices, and the capital necessary to improve water services and
56
infrastructures in developing countries when public entities had failed.
In need of the aid, the Bolivian government complied with the condition
and offered a concession to a private corporation. However, because of
the high cost of the packaged development plan, it only attracted one
bidder-Aguas del Tunari (AdT), which was controlled by a subsidiary
of Bechtel Enterprises.5 7
From the outset, the contract was rife with exploitations and lack of
transparency. The people of Cochabamba knew nothing of the plan to
privatize the water systems, let alone who Bechtel or AdT were.58 The
52. ELIZABETH A. LARSON, AT THE INTERSECTION OF NEOLIBERAL DEVELOPMENT,

SCARCE
RESOURCES,
AND
HUMAN
RIGHTS
10-11
(2010),
available at
http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/intlstudieshonors10/.
53. See Thompson, supra note 5, at 38 (examining how privatization increases water
prices).
54. AKECH, supranote 10, at 6.
55. Maria McFarland Sdnchez-Moreno & Tracy Higgins, No Recourse: Transnational
Corporations and the Protection of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Bolivia, 27
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1663, 1748 (2004).
56. See id. at 1748-49 (describing the failure of public entities to mean they were not a
"credible provider" and the World Bank requiring the exploration of privatization).
57. Id. at 1750-51 (Aguas del Tunari's majority shareholder was International Waters
Limited, which in turn was a subsidiary of Bechtel Enterprises, an American corporation).
58. Timothy O'Neill, Note, Water and Freedom: The Privatization of Water and its
Implications for Democracy and Human Rights in the Developing World, 17 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 357, 365 (2006).
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negotiations with AdT were conducted in secret and the deal was only
announced when the final contract was signed.59 As the only bidderand given Bolivia's need to privatize to receive the foreign aid-AdT was
able to negotiate with the government for more favorable terms.6 ° For
all the terms of the contract to be legal, Bolivia had to change the legal
framework of its water laws such that the government could have
complete property rights in water and then confer those rights to third
parties. 6' The legislation was drafted hastily and pushed through
despite strong opposition from indigenous groups and the public more
generally. 62 The new law significantly altered the principles of
affordability and universal access that were essential to the original
water laws.63
The fallout from the lack of transparency, public participation, and
accountability was substantial. Prices soared by as much as 400
percent, partially due to the expense of tackling an infrastructure
expansion under the contract, and communities that managed their
water separately suddenly received water bills from AdT.64 Tens of
thousands gathered in the capital to demand that the government
terminate the contract, but they were answered with military and police
aggression, from which many were injured and six were killed. 6' The
relationship between AdT and the government ended when AdT decided
to leave the country, resulting in the return of66water services to public
control and the repeal of the water law statute.
Lack of good governance has led to similar tales of demise for
private water conglomerates on nearly every continent. Privatization in
Manila, Philippines was the first large-scale water privatization venture
in Asia in 1997, but it also had disastrous results. 67 Prices increased
between 500-700 percent, almost half of Manila's residents remained
unconnected to water infrastructure, and in 2001, ninety-three percent
59. Sdnchez-Moreno & Tracy Higgins, supra note 55, at 1752.
60. O'Neill, supra note 58, at 366 (favorable terms to AdT included a 40-year lease on
the city's water system, ability to tie rates to the U.S. Consumer Price Index, and install
meters to monitor consumption from its meters as well as others).
61. Sdnchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 55, at 1759-61.
62. Id. at 1758-60 (Law 2029 on Potable Water Services and Sanitary Sewage was
passed with virtually no opposition, no consultation with interested groups, and it was
passed after only one forty-eight hour session such that the public had no time to react).
63. O'Neill, supra note 58, at 367.
64. Id. at 367-68.
65. BECHTEL CO., COCHABAMBA AND THE AGUAS DEL TUNARI CONSORTIUM 4 (Dec.

2005),
available
at
http://www.bechtel.com/assets/files/PDF/CochabambaFact%
20SheetDecember_2005.pdf.
66. SAnchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 55, at 1771.
67. See Hale, supra note 8, at 772 (describing the effects of privatization as
"diminish[ing] the public's access to quality water" and water being 'less affordable").
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lacked access to sanitation systems.6 8 Moreover, poor water treatment
led to a cholera outbreak that infected hundreds and killed six, and E.
coli contaminations were recorded at more than 700 percent of the
regulatory standard.69 Virtually no meaningful improvements in the
water delivery system eventually led to a complete restructuring of the
contracts and management scheme.7 °
Atlanta, Georgia and Indianapolis, Indiana are two examples from
the United States that brought in multinational private corporations to
alleviate the financial burdens that water delivery put on the local
governments. Shortly after entering into the contracts, prices and
customer complaints soared, poor water treatment caused public boil
notices, and there were allegations of corruption.7 1 Ultimately, both
cities terminated the contracts and suffered millions of dollars in lost
revenues due to unfulfilled contract obligations, renegotiations, and
litigations.72
In Dar es Salaam, the government of Tanzania decided to privatize
its water system and installed water meters to track usage and charge
for full-cost recovery after decades of fully subsidizing water to
citizens. 73 The government accepted a bid from a consortium led by
Biwater, a British water corporation. But just two years after the
contract was finalized, evidence of poor planning and underbidding on
the part of Biwater caused the government to terminate the contract
and incur millions in lost infrastructure repair expectations. 74
Throughout the process, citizens were unaware of the privatization plan
and were suddenly faced with soaring prices and water shut-offs.75
There was virtually no opportunity to express public concerns and
documents were kept confidential such that not even Members of
68. Id.
69. Id. at 773.
70. Id. at 768.
71. See Arnold, supra note 11, 799-800 (discussing the outcome of privatization of
water services in Atlanta); A Closer Look: Veolia Environment, FOOD & WATER WATCH,
Sept. 2010, available at http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/factsheet/a-closer-look-veolia/
[hereinafter Fact Sheet] (discussing the outcome of privatization of water services in
Indianapolis); Chris O'Malley, Consultant: Indianapolis Water Utility Lax in Overseeing
Veolia, INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J., Oct. 17, 2009 (discussing some of the factors that led to the
failure of privatization in Indianapolis).
72. See Arnold, supra note 11, at 800 (discussing the termination of a contract for
private water services in Atlanta); Fact Sheet, supra note 71 (discussing the costs of
terminating the contract for private water service in Indianapolis).
73. See AKECH, supranote 10, at 63, 66-67.
74. Id. at 67-69.
75. Id. at 65-66; see also ROMILLY GREENHILL & IRENE WEKIYA, ACTION AID INT'L,
TURNING OFF THE TAPS: DONOR CONDITIONALITY AND WATER PRIVATIZATION IN DAR ES

SALAAM (2004), available at http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doclib/turningoffthetaps.pdf.
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Parliament were permitted to review them.76 The executive was
effectively able to push the privatization plan through with virtually no
check on its power.77
Despite these pitfalls, many countries, including the United States,
the Philippines, and Tanzania, still contract with the private sector
because the local governments are mired in budget constraints and
simply do not have the capital to make water utilities operationally
viable. 7
2. Promises:Arguments Supporting Private Sector Participation
Despite abundant accounts of privatization failures from opponents,
there are still important reasons for governments to consider private
sector participation. In developing nations, private sector investment is
likely to be a fundamental component to expanding access. Moreover,
developed countries must confront extraordinary financing demands to
repair and maintain aging water infrastructure. 79 For instance, the
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) released its report on the
status of the United States' overall infrastructure in 2009.80 The results
were dismal.8 ' The ASCE gave drinking water and wastewater systems
a D- rating, observing that aging pipes "lose an estimated 7 billion
gallons of drinking water per day" and that it would take more than
"$11 billion in additional funding each year just to bring drinking water
systems into compliance with federal regulations."8 2 President Barack
Obama addressed the dire state of water infrastructure in the economic
stimulus package signed into effect in 2009, but the bill only allocated
$2 billion for drinking water and $4 billion for wastewater projects. 3
The stimulus package offers hope for addressing the challenge of
maintaining the nation's access to water, but it also demonstrates that
76. AKEcH, supranote 10, at 66.
77. Id.
78. See generally Craig Anthony Arnold, Privatization of Public Water Services: The
States' Role in EnsuringPublic Accountability, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 561, 569 (discussing the
United States); Hale, supra note 8 (discussing the Philippines); AKECH, supra note 10, at
62 (discussing Tanzania).
79. Arnold, supra note 78, at 570.
80. Ed Hightower, With US Infrastructure in Tatters, Stimulus Plan Offers Paltry
Sum, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE (Feb. 14, 2009), www.wsws.org/articles/2009/
feb2009/infr-fl4.shtml.
81. Id. (the report gave the overall status of the nation's infrastructure a "D" grade).
82. Id.
83. Press Release, American Water Works Ass'n, Stimulus Legislation Small Step
Forward
in
Addressing
Water
Needs
(Feb. 17,
2009),
available at
http://www.drinktap.org/mediadnn/Portals/6/PressReleases/02 17-09 stimulussigning.pd
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the challenge is daunting and more capital must be obtained by other
means. Thus, private participation offers enticing answers.
Proponents of privatization point to the financial limitations of the
public sector, coupled with examples of the public failures to efficiently
manage water resources, as the primary justifications for the trend
toward privatization of water resource management.84 Advocates
specifically point to examples of corruption, inefficiency, susceptibility to
political influences, poorly maintained infrastructure, and lack of
investment under public management of water resources. 85 There are
examples in which these flaws, as well as subsidies, directly contributed
to lower prices and greater access to clean water and sanitation for
upper- and middle-income groups while86 poor communities paid more
and suffered from stifled access to water.
We can look to the situation before and after the contract with AdT
in Bolivia as examples of public sector shortcomings. Prior to the
government's contract with AdT, the municipal water agency-Servicio
Municipal de Agua Potable y Acantrillado (SEMAPA)-controlled the
water utilities. 87 Residents in Cochabamba faced constant water
shortages; half of the city was not even connected to the water system;
SEMAPA's tariff scheme was such that the heaviest users were charged
less than low-water users; approximately 50 percent of transported
water was lost; quality was not monitored; the system was operating at
a loss of $2.25 million per year; and the gross inefficiencies led to
rationing.88 A combination of political corruption and foreign debt are
blamed as the factors that crippled SEMAPA. 0
Almost ten years after the dissolution of the contract with AdT,
Cochabamba's water system is back in the hands of SEMAPA and
residents are once again experiencing water shortages-or no service at
all-and higher rates. 90 In 2009, Bolivia enacted a new Constitution

84. See WORLD BANK GROUP, SUSTAINING WATER FOR ALL IN A CHANGING CLIMATE:
WORLD BANK GROUP IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS REPORT OF THE WATER RESOURCES

SECTOR STRATEGY 40-44 (2010) [hereinafter WORLD BANK 2010 REPORT], available at
http://water.worldbank.org/water/publications/sustaining-water-all-changing-climateworld-bank-group-implementation-progress-report (discussing World Bank strategies for
developing public-private partnerships in the water sector).
85. Petrova, supranote 13, at 587.
86. Id.
87. S~nchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 55, at 1748.
88. O'Neill, supra note 58, at 363-65.
89. Id. at 364.
90. Morgan McDonald, Note, Assessing the New Wave: TransactionCosts of Water Law
Reform in Latin America, 17 Sw. J. INT'L LAW 175, 191 (2011).
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that guarantees access to clean drinking water as a fundamental human
right, but expressly forbids private investment in water services: 9'
Every person has the right to universal and equitable
access to basic services of potable water. . . . It is the
responsibility of the State, at all levels of government, to
provide basic services through public, mixed, cooperative
or community entities. . . . Access to water and sewer
systems are human rights, are not the object of
concession or privatization, and are subject to a regimen
of licensing and registration, in accordance with the
law.92
Bolivia continues to be in desperate need of infrastructure repair,
93
but the government has failed to make the necessary investments.
Consequently, SEMAPA cannot meet the needs of its customers, and the
government's failure to provide access has essentially placed it in direct
violation of its own human rights provision.
Privatization can address these shortcomings by offering
desperately needed financing to improve infrastructure and increase
water delivery, thereby improving the possibility for widespread access
to clean, drinkable water. Additionally, it relieves the political risks
public actors might face if public management failed and places this risk
on private entities less susceptible to political influences. 94 Privatization
remains an important mechanism for states to achieve access to water
for all citizens while also promoting efficiency and conservation through
more accurate pricing. 95
Yet examples of privatization in Bolivia, the Philippines, Tanzania,
and the United States also demonstrate that some of the shortcomings
of public management can also be seen in private management. Prices
for water remain high in Bolivia under public management, and private

91. Id.
92. NUEVA CONSTITUcION POLITICA DEL ESTADO [C.P.] art. 20(I)-(III) (2009) (Bol.),
translated in WORLD CONSTITUTIONS ILLUSTRATED (Jefri Jay Ruchti ed., Embassy of Bol.
trans., 2011).
93. See McDonald, supranote 90, at 191-92; Sinchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 55,
at 1774.
94. See Elliot Curry, Comment, Water Scarcity and the Recognition of the Human Right
to Safe Freshwater, 9 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 103, 113 (2010) (discussing the shifting of
risk being desirable when governments already fail to provide adequate water).
95. See McDONALD & RUITERS, supra note 9, at 18 (discussing the benefits of
corporatization and privatization of water, such as creating a transparent form of
accounting allowing "hidden" costs to be seen).
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Indianapolis did not yield the expected financing for
management in
9 6
infrastructure.
If privatization of water is to be implemented effectively such that it
does not compromise the livelihood of citizens and achieves desired
efficiency results, "there is a need to establish institutional mechanisms
that will enable citizens to participate in their formulation, and hold
governments and private actors accountable for the implementation and
consequences of such process." 97 One available mechanism is the
presence of enforceable rights in domestic laws. Rights provide the
foundation upon which citizens may make demands against their
governments. But more significantly, it is a substantive platform upon
which citizens may stand and require powerful public and private actors
to account for their decisions.
B. Water as a Human Right
1. Current Status of Water in InternationalLaw
Several forms of international documentation either explicitly or
implicitly support a right to water. International human rights treaties
create binding obligations on state parties to fulfill the commitments
enshrined in the text.98 As such, treaties are the strongest source for an
investigation of international law regarding a right to access to clean
drinking water. Next are forms of non-binding norms developed through
the United Nations, often through declarations, principles, or
guidelines. 99 These sources are useful for defining the right to water,
and, although they do not carry the force of law, they at least
demonstrate political commitments among states to implicitly provide a
right to access to clean drinking water.
A handful of international treaties explicitly reference state
responsibilities concerning water, but they fall short of ensuring a
general or individual claim against the state for accessibility to clean
drinking water. The treaties with the clearest provisions concerning
water are the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against
96. For other examples of water privatization shortcomings, see Petrova, supra note
13, at 589-90 (discussing privatization of Manila's water system in the Philippines); see
also McDonald, supra note 90, at 185-202 (discussing privatization of water systems in
Bolivia, Argentina, and Uruguay).
97. AKECH, supra note 10, at 31.
98. KNUT BOURQUAIN, FRESHWATER ACCESS FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE: A
CHALLENGE TO INTERNATIONAL WATER AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 12-13 (2008).
99. See InternationalLaw, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2012) (providing
access to the text of a multitude of conventions and protocols).
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Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),
and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).
The CEDAW was developed to bring women's rights into the forefront of
human rights discussions and focused on the legal and cultural
restrictions on the equality of women.' 00 Water is mentioned within the
context of the specific obstacles women in rural settings face under
Article 14, which requires states parties to take necessary steps to
ensure that such women are able "[t]o enjoy adequate living conditions,
electricity and water
particularly in relation to housing, sanitation,
0
supply, transport and communications."' '
The CRC was similarly constructed to bring the interests of children
to the forefront of human rights considerations. 0 2 It discusses water
within the context of every child's right to "the highest attainable
standard of health."'0 3 In particular, states must take steps to provide
"adequate nutritious food and drinking water" to combat disease and
malnutrition among children' ° 4 Article 28 of the CRPD is another
source of international law in which water is mentioned.'0 5 It provides
for an adequate standard of living and requires states parties to "ensure
equal access by persons with disabilities to clean water services, and
services, devices and other
ensure access to appropriate and affordable
06
assistance for disability-related needs."'
International humanitarian law also expressly protects access to
water during violent conflicts.'0 7 The Third Geneva Convention on the
Treatment of Prisoners of War requires prisoners of war to receive a
sufficient supply of drinking water and the Fourth Geneva Convention
on the protection of civilians during times of war and Additional
0 8
Protocols I and II guarantee the same right to civilian internees.
However, these rights are guaranteed within the context of violent

100. See generally Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
101. Id. at art. 14, 2(h).
102. See generally Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC].
103. Id. at art. 24, 1.

104. Id.

2.

105. Id. at art. 28.
106. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 28, 2(a), adopted Dec.
13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRPD].
107. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
108. BOURQUAIN, supra note 98, at 124 (citing Articles 20, 26, 29, and 46 of the Geneva
Convention III in regards to prisoners of war; Articles 85, 89, and 127 of the Geneva
Convention IV and Articles 5(1)(b) and 14 of the Additional Protocol II for civilian
internees).
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conflict only, and therefore, neither amount to a general, individual
right to water. 109
Despite explicit mentions of water in each of these international
treaties, none of them actually provide a general right to clean
freshwater that an individual can assert against the state. In the CRC,
providing clean water is only one of a handful of positive actions the
state can take to meet its obligation to protect the health of children." °
The CEDAW is also limited because it applies protections for a right to
access to water even more narrowly within the context of discrimination
against rural women." ' The CRC, though more comprehensive,
contemplates water rights merely as a function of health," 2 and the
Geneva Conventions are similarly limited because they only apply
during times of conflict.'13
The two primary international treaties on human rights that
implicitly support a human right to water are the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). These
human rights treaties require states to "take appropriate steps" to
protect rights to life, to an adequate standard of living, to food, and to
health-rights in which access to water is implicitly necessary for their
realization.' ' 4 The existence of an implied human right to clean drinking
water through the combination of these treaties appears strong, but the
ICCPR and the ICESCR are also weak foundations for a right to water.
For instance, the ICCPR states, "no one shall be arbitrarilydeprived of
his life.""' 5 The term "arbitrary" implies that there are some instances in
which a non-arbitrary deprivation could be justified." 6 Thus, as long as
individuals are able to find water, the state has no direct obligation
under the ICCPR to take steps to increase water access. The ICESCR
"recognize[s] the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living.""' 7
But to realize an adequate standard of living for citizens, much more
water must be provided and for many more uses than needed for

109. Id.
110. CRC art. 24, 1.
111. BOURQUAIN, supranote 98, at 198.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 124.
1, adopted Dec. 19,
114. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (explaining that "[elvery human being has
the inherent right to life"); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights arts. 11-12, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]
(explaining that every human has the right adequate food, housing, and good health).
115. ICCPR art. 6, 1 (emphasis added).
116. BOURQUAIN, supra note 98, at 125-26.
117. ICESCR art. 11, 1.
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survival. 118 This includes water for farming, hygiene and sanitation,
drinking and cooking, all in adequate amounts."1 9 Moreover, the
mandate for states to "take steps" to protect the human rights curbs the
imposition of a direct state obligation, 20 especially an obligation to
provide a resource that is not expressly mentioned. Thus, these treaties
fall short of guaranteeing an individual claim because any requirement
for the state to provide clean drinking water is only inferred.
2. Progresstoward Actualization of a Human Right to Water in
InternationalLaw
To directly address this lacuna in international human rights law,
the U.N. General Assembly, in 2010, passed Resolution 64, expressing
its recognition of the "right to safe drinking water and sanitation as a
human right that is essential for the fulfillment of life and all human
rights."' 2' Resolution 64 was met with broad international support with
a large majority of members voting in its favor. 122 Later that year, the
U.N. Human Rights Council reaffirmed the General Assembly's findings
and issued a similar resolution stating that "the human right to safe
drinking water and sanitation is derived from the right to an adequate
standard of living and inextricably related to the right to the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health, as well as the right
to life and human dignity.,'2 3 The Council also expanded on states'
responsibilities as the principle guardians of human rights.'2 4 It called
upon states to develop strategies, legislation, and regulation; to
guarantee transparency and community participation in the planning
and implementation process; to ensure non-discrimination so that the
right will be realized for all; to safeguard the availability of effective
25
remedies; and to require that accountability mechanisms are in place.
Finally, the Council emphasized that even when water delivery services

118. BOURQUAIN, supranote 98, at 139.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 141.
121. G.A. Res. 64/292, at 2, U.N. Doc. A1RES/641292 (July 28, 2010).
122. Press Release, General Assembly Adopts Resolution Recognizing Access to Clean
Water, Sanitation as Human Right, By Recorded Vote of 122 in Favour, None Against, 41
Abstentions, U.N. Press Release GA/10967 (July 28, 2010) (stating no countries opposed,
but that the United States was one of forty-one countries that abstained).
123. Human Rights Council Res. 15/9, Res. on Human Rights and Access to Safe
Drinking Water and Sanitation, 15th Sess., Sept. 30, 2010, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Res/15/9, at
2 (Sept. 30, 2010).
124. See id. at 3 (listing the states' responsibilities with regard to human rights).
125. Id.
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are delegated to non-state actors, the state continues to bear the
responsibility to ensure the realization of the human right.126
Neither of these resolutions created binding international law, 127 but
they imply a commitment to establish a binding right to water in the
have recognized a
future. However, an increasing number of countries
2
human right to water in their domestic laws.
3. State Recognitions of a Human Right to Water
Since the state of international law on access to water is nebulous,
the existence of a human right to water is strongest under national law.
Several states recognize a human right to water, either explicitly
through provisions in their Constitutions or implicitly through court
interpretations of pre-existing rights.' 29 Constitutions are the strongest
source of rights protections, and several nations provide explicit rights
to drinking water. 30 Moreover, national courts have upheld corporate
obligations to respect the right to water, demonstrating a willingness to
enforce those human rights guarantees.' 3 '
Presently, the Constitutions of several countries explicitly provide
for a right to clean water.' 32 In Africa, these include the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Gambia, Kenya, South Africa, Uganda,
and Zambia;3 3 in the Americas, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Uruguay,
126. Id.
127. See InternationalLaw, supra note 99 (explaining that resolutions do not create
binding law).
128. See, e.g., The Rights to Water and Sanitation in National Law, THE RIGHT TO
WATER AND SANITATION, http://www.righttowater.info/progress-so-far/nationallegislationon-the-right-to-water/ (last visited April 25, 2012) (listing countries that provide a right to
clean water).
129. Jernej Letnar Cerni6, Corporate Obligations Under the Human Right to Water, 39
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 303, 320 (2011).
130. Id.
131. For example, the Constitution of India guarantees a right to life but has no explicit
right to water. INDIA CONST., art. 21. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of India
interpreted the right to life to include rights "to food, water, decent environment,
education, medical care and shelter." Chameli Singh v. State of UttarPradeshA.I.R. 1996
8 (India). It later re-affirmed its commitment to a human right to water,
S.C. 1051,
stating "water is fundamental to life and there is a duty on the state under Article 21 to
provide clean drinking water to its citizens." A.P. Pollution Control Board v. Prof. N.V.
Nayudu, (2001) 4 I.L.R. 657, 3 (India).
132. The Rights to Water and Sanitation in National Law, supra note 128.
133. Id.; CONST. OF THE DEM. REP. CONGO May 13, 2005, art. 48 (providing for the right
to decent housing as well as potable water); CONST. OF FED. DEM. REP. OF ETH. Dec. 8,
1994, art. 90 (providing a right to water to the extent that the state can provide it); CONST.
OF REP. OF GAm. 1997, art. 216(4) (providing the state must endeavor to provide equal
access to clean, safe water); CONSTITUTION, art. 43(1)(d) (1992) (Kenya) (providing
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and
Massachusetts
States-specifically,
United
and
the
Pennsylvania.1 4 An additional handful of states have recognized a
human right to water as inferred from other existing constitutional
rights. These countries include India, Colombia, and Belgium, among
others.' Meanwhile, other countries are currently considering36a right
to water in their Constitutions, including Mexico and Colombia.'
C. Privatizationand Human Rights in South Africa: A Progressive
Constitutionand a "Reasonable"Court
South Africa's recognition of a human right to water is particularly
significant for three reasons. First, the country enjoys global recognition
for its progressive Constitution and Constitutional Court, which
provides and protects socioeconomic rights, including the right to
water. 137 Second, South Africa was the first nation in the world to hear a
case concerning the right to water in its highest court, setting an
important precedent for future litigation on the right to water that can

everyone has a right to water in "adequate quantities and reasonable quality"); S. AFR.
CONST, art. 27, 1996 (providing a right to "sufficient" water); CONST. OF REP. OF UGANDA
Oct. 8, 1995, Objective XIV ("The state shall endeavor to ensure that ... all Ugandans
enjoy... clean and safe water"); CONST. OF ZAMBIA of 1991 (as amended by Act No. 18 of
1996), art. 112 ('The state shall endeavor to provide clean and safe water").
134. The Rights to Water and Sanitation in National Law, supra note 128;
CONSTITUcI6N POLfTICA DE BOLIVIA [C.P.] art. 20(I), (III) (2009) (everyone has a universal
and equitable right of access to potable water, which is a human right, and privatization of
water services is prohibited); POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF REP. OF EQUADOR Oct. 20, 2008,
art. 276(4) (providing for "permanent and quality access to water"); CONSTITUCION
POLiTICA DE LA REPOBLICA DE NICARAGUA [CN.] tit. VI, ch. I, art. 105, LA GACETA, DIARIO
OFICIAL [L.G.] 16 September 2010 (the state is obligated to provide public services
including water and the public has an inalienable right of access to these services);
CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REP. ORIENTAL DEL URUGUAY [C.P.] 1967, art. 47
(confirming that access to drinking water is a fundamental human right); MASS. CONST.
art. 49 ("The people shall have a right to clean air and water."); PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27
(guaranteeing a right to "pure water" and the state government must protect water among
other resources for the benefit of the people).
135. See The Rights to Water and Sanitation in National Law, supra note 128 (listing
numerous countries that have recognized a right to water).
136. See Another Victory for the Human Right to Water in Mexico, UNITARIAN
UNIVERSALIST SERV. COMM. (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.uusc.org/article/2012/01/01/
anothervictoryjor the human..right to_water_in mexico (explaining that Mexico will
soon recognize the human right to water and sanitation in their Constitutions); Andrew
Willis Garc6s, Colombia: Fighting Development Banks for the Human Right to Water,
UPSIDE DOWN WORLD (Mar. 30, 2009, 10:49 AM), http://upsidedownworld.org/main
contentlview/1786/1/ (explaining that coalitions and consumer organizations have been
organizing since 2007 to add a human right to water to the Constitution).
137. LARSON, supra note 52, at 6.

PLUGGING THE DEMOCRACY DRAIN

serve as a model for enforcement in other developing countries. 18
Finally, South Africa's water policies create a unique setting that
reflects the convergence of progressive socioeconomic rights enshrined
in a Constitution and entrenched neoliberal economic policies,
influenced by its long-term relationship with the World Bank. 3 9 These
factors make South Africa a vibrant example for exploring the
enforcement of a human right to water, and also demonstrate that there
are possibilities for privatization to operate within a human rights
framework.
South Africa's post-apartheid Constitution is a body of national law
that endeavors to reflect socioeconomic rights available in international
laws such as the ICESCR as well as the African Charter of Humans and
People's Rights. Section 27 of the Constitution addresses the human
right to water:
(1) Everyone shall have the right to have access to-(a)
health care services, including reproductive health care;
(b) sufficient food and water; and (c) social security ....
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve
the
40
progressive realization of each of these rights. 1
Since the adoption of this Constitution, South Africa has also
actively engaged the private sector in the management and expansion of
its water delivery systems with the assistance and guidance of the
World Bank. 141
Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg(Mazibuko) is the seminal case in
which the Constitutional Court directly addressed the right to water
and clarified the state's constitutional obligations within the context of
privatization. 142 In 2001, Johannesburg privatized its municipal water
delivery system, creating Johannesburg Water, to "leverage private
sector expertise to build a financially viable and efficient water and
sanitation entity."143 Johannesburg Water then entered a five-year
contract with Johannesburg Water Management (JOWAVI), a joint

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. S. AFR. CONST., art. 27, 1996 (emphasis added).
141. Suez alone was involved in at least seven different water privatization contracts
between 1986 and 2001. See Suez in South Africa, PUBLIC CITIZEN, available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/suezinsouthafrica.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2012).
142. See generally Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) (S. Mr.).
143. WATER DIALOGUES-SOUTH

AFRICA, DISCUSSION DOCUMENT ON CROSS CUTTING

ISSUES (2009), available at www.waterdialogues.org/south-africa/downloads/Att-17.doc.
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venture between the multinational corporation Suez and its subsidiaries
in the United Kingdom and South Africa.'" According to the contract,
JOWAM45 was responsible for the day-to-day operations of Johannesburg
Water. 1
The plaintiffs in Mazibuko were residents of Phiri Township, an
apartheid-era settlement for Sotho and Tswana peoples in Soweto, on
the outskirts of Johannesburg. 46 The exceptionally densely populated
neighborhood dealt with inadequate water supply due to decades-old,
leaking water pipelines. 4 7 Soweto residents had been paying a flat rate
for water use based on an assumed use of twenty kiloliters per
household, but Johannesburg Water observed that actual consumption
in Soweto was more than triple that figure. 41 Johannesburg Water
estimated that up to 75 percent of Soweto water was not paid for,
although it is uncertain whether this was because of non-payment or
water lost through dilapidated piping. 49 Cost recovery was integral to
the privatization plan, so JOWAM initiated project Gcin'amanzi, in
to improve customer
which pre-paid meters were installed in Phiri
150
payments and achieve "sustainable results."'
While residents were guaranteed a free minimum amount of water
through the government's Free Basic Water Policy (six kiloliters per
household per month), many could not afford additional water to meet
their daily needs. 5' Although two other payment schemes were
available, the plaintiffs claimed they were only informed of, and had to
accept, the pre-paid meter installations, which if the pre-paid meter was
not installed the water was shut off.' 52 All plaintiffs with pre-paid
meters indicated that subsidized water provisions did not last beyond
the middle of each month, causing families to constantly ration their
water. 53 Families caring for sick family members especially struggled to
find the means to pay for more water and ration what they had. 5 4 The
plaintiffs alleged that the pre-paid meter project represented a
144. CARINA VAN ROOYEN, ET AL., WATER DIALOGUES, JOHANNESBURG CASE STUDY 17

http://www.waterdialogues.org/south-africa/documents/
at
available
(2009),
JohannesburgCaseStudy-FullReport.pdf (last visited April 25, 2012).
145. Id. (Suez owned 66% of the shares).
146. LARSON, supra note 52, at 40.
147. Id. (180 persons per hectare).
148. Mazibuko, 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 6 para. 11.
149. Id. at 7 para. 12.
150. SUEZ ENVIRONMENT, WATER STORIES: JOHANNESBURG WATER CONTRACT 9 (2010),

available at http:llwww.suez-environnement.fr/wp-contentuploads/2010/07/water-stories_
johannesburg-fr bd21-06-10.pdf.
151. See LARSON, supranote 52, at 41-42.
152. Mazibuko, 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 8 para.16.
153. LARSON, supra note 52, at 41-44.
154. Id.
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regression from the constitutional requirement for "progressive
realization" of the right to water; that the free six kiloliters per
household per month was unconstitutional because it did not provide a
sufficient amount of water as required under the Constitution; and that
the limitation to six kiloliters indirectly discriminated against poor
black Africans who live in larger households and cannot afford more
water beyond the subsidized amount.'5 5
The Constitutional Court disagreed, concluding that both the six
kiloliters per household under the Free Basic Water Policy and the
prepaid meters were constitutional. 15 6 It based its decision on a prior
case, Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, which
dealt with the right to housing under Section 27 of South Africa's
Constitution. In Grootboom, the Constitutional Court held that Section
157
27(1) does not create "absolute or unqualified" rights without more.
Rather, subdivision (1) must be read in conjunction with the state's
obligations in subdivision (2) to fulfill those rights within reasonable
means.'58 Applying Grootboom to water, the court held that the state is
not obligated to provide every person with sufficient water, but must
take reasonable steps "to reali[ze] the achievement of the right of access
to sufficient water, within available resources."'5 9 In other words, as long
as the state is taking some action to achieve sufficient access to water, it
is meeting its constitutional obligations.
Applying the reasonableness test adopted in Grootboom, the Court
found that the current pricing schemes for water and pre-paid meters
were all constitutionally reasonable steps toward the realization of the
right to water. 60 Influential to the Court's conclusion was the state
burden of adopting alternatives: the complexities of Johannesburg's
water infrastructure; the difficulty of determining the number of people
living in each Johannesburg home so that water could be subsidized per
person rather than per household; and the fact that the heavier water
users were charged more to fund the subsidies for poor neighborhoods.
The court found all of these factors indicative of a reasonable water
policy.' 6' Moreover, the Court held that it would be improper to
determine what is "sufficient," stating it was a matter for "the
institutions of government best placed to investigate social conditions in

155. Id. at 44.
156. Mazibuko, 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 5-6 para. 9.
157. Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at
para. 38 (S. Mr.).
158. Mazibuko, 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 25 para. 49-50.
159. Id. (emphasis added).
160. See id. at 82 para. 156-57 (discussing what it requires to be reasonable).
161. Id. at 42-49 para. 84-97.

492

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:1

light of available budgets and to determine
what targets are achievable
162
in relation to social and economic rights."
The Mazibuko case has received both resounding praise as well as
deep criticism from the international community. 63 For some, the Court
trounced human rights interests with neoliberal economic development
arguments. M But such criticism is less compelling when states must
balance rights with limited resources. A reasonableness test can be a
useful approach for giving a state flexibility in the endeavor to meet
constitutional obligations within budget and resource allocation
constraints. Furthermore, establishing a bare minimum quantity and
quality allocation of water to all individuals is a technical decision best
left to policymakers and the more democratic branches. Although the
outcome of Mazibuko may not have been ideal for the citizens of Phiri,
the virtue of the Court's decision is that it necessitates democratic
accountability in the legislative and executive branches. Government
actors must make reasonable policy choices in the administration of
water delivery and continue to make progress toward the realization of
the right to water.
In this way, the Constitutional Court effectively filled a void in
international discourse concerning the human right to water: it went
beyond the recognition of a human right and articulated a feasible path
for the state to meet human rights obligations, urging reasonable and
democratically accountable policy decisions from legislators and
executives.1 65 The reasonableness test may not be perfect, but it lays the
foundation for better governance and stronger democratic accountability
procedures.

162. Id. at 30 para. 61.
163. Compare Paul O'Connell, The Death of Socio-Economic Rights, 74 MODERN L. REV.
532, 551-52 (2011) (criticizing the case for undermining socio-economic rights and
returning to the neo-liberal approach to development) with Rep. of the Special Rapporteur
on the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, Compilation of Good
Practices, 96, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/33/Add.1 (June 29, 2011) (by
Catarina de Albuquerque) (pointing to Mazibuko as an example of litigation that helps
realize the right to water).
164. See generally LARSON, supra note 52 (examining the Mazibuko case in South Africa
and how economic globalization in developing nations with constrained budgets can
compete with issues raised by human rights).
165. See Mazibuko, 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 30 para. 61; see also Eric C. Christiansen,
Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights: Socio-Economic Rights and the South African
Constitutional Court, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 321, 323-24 (2007); What Price for the
Priceless?Implementing Justiciabilityof the Right to Water, Note, 120 HARv. L. REV. 1067,
1087-88 (2007); but see O'Connell, supra note 163.

PLUGGING THE DEMOCRACY DRAIN

III. PLUGGING THE DEMOCRACY DRAIN AND THE APPLICABILITY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Public law principles of transparency, public participation, and
accountability have been neglected in public and private transfers of
water service utilities, 166 but infusing these principles into the
privatization process has the potential to address access to water
challenges: they function to reduce instances of corruption, ensure
accountability and regulatory enforcement, open doors for funding
through accountable private sector participation, and reestablish trust
in government. 167 Such democratic accountability procedures can help
facilitate communication between citizens and the government.
Protected procedural rights help make democracy possible; they are
essential for putting democracy into practice.168 While procedural rights
grounded in principles of transparency, public participation, and
accountability are not a panacea for access to water challenges, these
procedural rights and 169
principles give force and clarity to a substantive
human right to water.
A. Improving DemocraticAccountability Through Public Law Principles
1. Transparency
Transparency is the promise of access to information. 170 An informed
public is able to recognize and bring attention to issues that may arise
under a certain course of action before decisions are finalized. 7'
Additionally, when other means for oversight are lacking, an informed
public may be able to challenge questionable practices. Transparency

166. Bolivia is just one example, but the events in Indianapolis raise questions as well.
Other instances are observed in AKECH, supra note 10 (Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda).
167. See Bende Toth, Public Participation and Democracy in Practice-Aarhus
Convention Principles as Democratic Institution Building in the Developing World, 30 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 295, 328-39 (2010).
168. Id.
169. See generally id. (analyzing the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information;
although this convention applies to environmental concerns, it does not address drinking
water specifically), accord CARE USA & CARE DENMARK, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATERBEYOND ACCESS, SUBMISSION TO THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER ON HUMAN
RIGHTS (2007).
170. See Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration's
Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit, 41 Vand. J.
Transnat'l L. 775, 809-10 (2008).
171. Toth, supra note 167, at 297.
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helps to minimize opportunities for corruption."'
Moreover,
transparency paves the way for the second and third democratic
principles-public participation and accountability.173 Without access to

information, the public cannot fulfill its role in the second principle;
without information, there is diminished knowledge of a justiciable
issue; and without details of adjudicatory outcomes and reasons for
those outcomes, legitimacy is lost. 7 4 The benefits to be gained from

public participation and the essence17of5 access to justice are significantly
watered down without transparency.
But for these benefits to be a reality, transparency requires
adequate access to information. 176 Transparency can fall on a spectrum:
on one end, information is available but may be disorganized or difficult
to find and attain, and on the other end states may take much more
proactive roles to collect and disseminate information. The preference,
of course, is that information should be easily accessible, clear, and
readily available. So called "sunshine laws" such as the Freedom of
Information Act in the United States, or the Promotion of Access to
Information Act in South Africa give citizens legal power to demand
transparency.177 Bolivia, on the other hand, does not have a similar
statutory protection for access to information
beyond the protection of
17
freedom of speech in the Constitution. 1
If sunshine laws can be applicable to government contracts with
private entities, it is possible that citizens could express concerns
regarding the effect that some provisions might have on their
livelihoods. In Bolivia, secret contract negotiations, bidding processes,
expedited legislation, and unpublished contracts, among other issues,
172. E.g. Hale, supranote 8, at 788-89 (lack of transparency and public participation in
Manila's regulatory agencies opened opportunities for corruption in the privatization
process); AKECH, supra note 10, at 68 (litigation in the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes revealed that City Water management threatened to
"try to force the hand of the [Tanzanian] government" if it would not be willing to
renegotiate the concession agreement) (quoting Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United
Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, 182).
173. See, e.g., Choudhury, supra note 170, at 811 (discussing lack of access to
information in arbitrations in the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes).
174. Id.
175. See Toth, supra note 167, at 299 (discussing how a lack of transparency about
"environmentally significant information" frustrates authorities and the public).
176. Id. at 298.
177. See generally Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2009); Promotion of
Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (S.Afr.).
178. Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2010: Bolivia, U.N. HIGH COMM'N FOR
REFUGEES

(Oct.

1,

2010),

http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,FREEHOU,,BOL,,

4ca5cc65a,0.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2012).
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are all indications of a severe lack of transparency. 7 9 Transparency in
each of these stages, as well as in the post-contract regulation stage, is
necessary to ensure access to clean water. It bears mentioning that the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights highlighted the lack of
communication between different sectors of society in Bolivia and
recommended that the government take steps to improve the channels
minimize mass demonstrations and prevent
of communication to
0
conflict escalations.18
The U.N. Report of the Independent Expert on the issue of human
rights obligations and access to water outlines several practices that81
both state and nonstate actors should adopt to increase transparency.'
Once a state decides to privatize water services, the state must
construct an implementation plan for the transfer of the utility to a
prospective private entity. 182 To protect the human interest in safe and
accessible drinking water, the plan must be disclosed to the public and
made open to criticism.'83 Moreover, that information should offer
details as to the "instruments that delegate service provision,"'' 84 such as
the proposed contract. A corporation's interest in maintaining the
the interest in
confidentiality
of the contract jeopardizes
transparency. 85 Complete confidentiality of such terms can present
risks to the realization of the human right to water, and governments
and private entities should take steps to minimize that risk. The
bidding process is also an important point for transparency. According
to the Report of the Independent Expert, companies allegedly underbid
for the purposes of winning the contract and then later renegotiating for
a higher price. 8 6 Renegotiations of the contract are not inherently
problematic, but strategic underbidding is contrary to the interest of
179. See generally Sdnchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 55 (examining corporate
conduct and the Bolivian government's role protecting economic, social, and cultural
rights).
180. INTER-AM. COMM'N H.R., ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND SOCIAL INCLUSION: THE ROAD

TOWARD STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY IN BOLIVIA
16, 45 (2007), available at
http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Bolivia2007eng/Bolivia07capl.eng.htm.
181. Rep. of the Independent Expert on the Issue of Human Rights ObligationsRelated to
Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/15/31 (June 29, 2010) (by Catarina de Albuquerque) [hereinafter "Report of the
Independent Expert"].
182. See, e.g., id. at
63(a) (suggesting that states should implement an action plan
with human rights concerns in mind).
183. See id. at 34.
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 31, at 192 (private contractors with the U.S.
government can choose not to comply with Freedom of Information Act requests for the
sake of protecting trade secrets and other confidential information).
186. Report of the Independent Expert, supra note 181, at 36.
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transparency and due diligence.1 87 The responsibility for minimizing the
possibility of these risks falls on both states and corporations.
2. Public Participation
"Public participation is a critical element for democratic governance
since it is essential for the realization of a just society. 1 88 It is through
public participation that citizens can ensure that their needs are fully
met. It "enhances the viability of policy initiatives," improves chances
for successful implementation, and establishes a sense of legitimacy in
the outcome.18 9 It should be noted that it is difficult to make
participation truly "public," especially for the poor and marginalized
groups who are sometimes silent in policy dialogue because they are
unfamiliar with the relevant jargon or are outright ignored. 90 Still,
public participation is essential to the fulfillment of democratic
governance. 191
In the context of water management, public participation fosters a
dialogue with those that are or will be affected by the decisions of state
or private actors. Such decisions will have consequences for the
environment and communities. Participation in the decision-making,
planning, and regulation processes will facilitate general understanding
of all the interests at stake 1 and
promote a plan for universal access to
92
water in a given community.
Especially in developing countries like Bolivia, governments
experienced
pressure from foreign actors to move toward
privatization. 93 Such pressures encouraged governments to move
forward
without
incorporating
insights
from
the
affected
communities. 194 Public participation is at the very heart of democracy
and such pressure without consultation undermines it. 195 Additionally,
the requirement of consultation and public participation can serve to
reduce opportunities for discrimination. The U.N. Independent Expert,
187. E.g., AKECH, supra note 10, at 67-68 (in the Tanzania experience, the private
company underbid and misrepresented its ability to perform the terms of the contract).
188. Id. at 32.
189. Id. at 33.
190. Id.
191. See id. at 32.
192. Report of the Independent Expert, supra note 181, at 34.
193. See Toth, supra 167, at 297 (describing various types of pressures a government
may feel).
194. See Report of the Independent Expert, supra note 181, at
35 (advising that
decisions of when to delegate to nonstate actors "should always be taken in the light of
local circumstances.").
195. AKECH, supra note 10, at 32-33.
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in a separate report, observed that in the United States the groups that
suffered from limited access to water "were disproportionately Black,
Latino, American Indian, [and] homeless."'196 The plaintiffs in Mazibuko
v. City of Johannesburg and the residents in Cochabamba demonstrate
the same inequality in developing counties.' 97 "The decision for, or
against, delegating service provision to non-State actors should always
be taken in light of the local circumstances."'' 98 Participation should not
be limited only to residents either. NGOs and corporations have an
important role to play as a voice for public, environmental, and other
concerns that may otherwise be underrepresented.99
Because private water service providers are often saddled with the
responsibility of managing water delivery services in addition to making
significant investments for water infrastructure expansion and
improvement projects, such actors are susceptible to serving
neighborhoods or regions that will yield the greatest financial returns. 2°°
Public participation and consultations will minimize these effects, but
the onus must fall on the state to mandate private water providers to
extend their services to under- and un-served communities.2 ' The state
bears the ultimate responsibility not to discriminate, to dedicate
particular attention to marginalized groups, and to ensure the
realization of a right to water.20 2 If a private entity is not able to provide
services to certain areas, the government should consider whether
subsidies and other tools might be employed to ensure access to water is
achieved. But that does not mean private entities are relieved of all
responsibility. Corporations contracting with the state are in an ideal
position to proactively raise concerns of discrimination or limited
coverage with the state; both governments and private entities must
work together to carefully ensure that their contracts provide coverage
for all.20 3 Through open participation, consultation, and careful analysis

196. Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation,
Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and
Sanitation, 79, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/33/Add.4 (August, 2011) (by
Catarina de Albuquerque).
197. See Mazibuko 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC)
10 (Phiri, where the plaintiffs lived, was a
predominantly poor, black neighborhood due to the effects of former apartheid urban
planning policies); See also Stinchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 55, at 1777-78 (the
Bolivian government did not consider issues of equity in its contract with AdT, and poorer
neighborhoods' rates increased disproportionately higher than others).
198. Report of the Independent Expert, supranote 181, 35.
199. Toth, supra note 167, at 320.
200. Report of the Independent Expert, supranote 181, 39.
201. Id. 40.
202. See id. 17.
203. Id. 42.
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of coverage strategies and contract terms, both corporations and
governments can improve access to drinking water.
3. Accountability with Transparentand Equitable Outcomes
Accountability is also critical because it deepens the relationship
between those in a position to wield power and those affected by such
power.2° It gives citizens the right to hold such actors "to a set of
standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in
light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that
these responsibilities have not been met. ' 20 5 In this way, accountability
fosters a more just exercise of power, creating incentives and
enforcement mechanisms that comport with individual rights and
liberties.206
An additional criticism of the Bolivia water disaster was that the
contract permitted AdT to file for arbitration at the International
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), where it
sought $25 million for its lost investment. 27 AdT successfully argued
that a bilateral investment treaty between the Netherlands and Bolivia
provided the necessary consent for both parties to be subject to
arbitration at ICSID. 0 8 But because ICSID functions at the consent of
and under the arbitration terms agreed upon by the parties, AdT was
able to request that proceedings be kept private-no members of the
press or the public could attend and all evidence presented to the panel
was confidential-and the tribunal honored that request by denying a
petition from Cochabamba residents requesting that ICSID intervene on
their behalf.20 9 Eventually, the case was dropped and the parties agreed
to a settlement.1 ° In protecting the human right to universal access to
clean water, states must be responsible for ensuring access to courts
with transparent and equitable outcomes, while private entities must be
careful not to adopt practices or seek contract terms that "obstruct

204. AKECH, supra note 10, at 33.
205. Id. (quoting Ruth W. Grant & Robert 0. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of
Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 29 (2005)).
206. Id.
207. Sdnchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 55, at 1771-72.
208. Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, Case No. ARB/023, Decision on
Respondent's Objections to Jurisdiction,
3, 7 (Oct. 21, 2005), 20 ICSID Rev. 450 (2005),
available at http://icsid.worldbank.orgICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=
showDoc&docId=DC629_En&caseId=C210.
209. Sinchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 55, at 1773.
210. Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/2, Introductory Note,
Sept. 28, 2006, 20 ICSID Rev. 445, 449 (2005).
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access to State-based accountability mechanisms, including court
proceedings. 2 1
Regulations are toothless without access to judicial accountability
and restitution.2 12 To ensure accountability, the roles and
responsibilities between public and private actors in water services
must be clearly defined and made apparent to the public.213 In this way,
consumers or other injured parties will know whom to hold accountable
for reprehensible actions and violations. 214 Access to justice also means
that lawsuits should not be so expensive that individuals cannot afford
to bring a suit. 215 Additionally, states should ensure that complaints are
adequately and thoroughly addressed and allow possibilities for
appeals.2 1 6 Finally, remedies must be delivered in a timely manner so
that cases do not become bogged down in the courts so long that they
become futile to continue.2 17
B. Application of Administrative Law and South Africa's Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act
If it is accepted that democratic accountability through public law
principles is essential to protecting human rights in privatization
practices, then it must be asked how states can implement the
and
participation,
of transparency,
principles
corresponding
accountability. One option is through administrative law reform. The
value of administrative law is that it regulates those who exercise public
power.21 8 Administrative law secures the protection of rights by
requiring officials to "follow fair and impartial decision procedures, act
within the bounds of statutory authority delegated by the legislature,
and respect private rights. '219 In essence, administrative law elaborates
on duties that constitutional and statutory provisions create.
Administrative law also plays an important watchdog role. It is a body

211. Report of the Independent Expert, supra note 181,

212. See id.

59, 62(f).

52-60.

213. Id. 57.
214. Id.
215. See Toth, supra note 167, at 311 (discussing that NGOs and citizens' groups can
help alleviate issues of costs for individuals in bringing a lawsuit).
216. See id. at 312 (explaining that under Article 9(2) of the Aarhaus Convention
signatories are to "ensure access to a review procedure," which may include appeals).
217. See id. (stating there is a need for adequate remedies that are 'fair, equitable,
timely and not prohibitively expensive").
218. See AKECH, supra note 10, at 138-39.
219. Id. at 138 (quoting Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First
Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (2003)).
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of law that can be used to ensure agencies fulfill statutory obligations. 220
Finally, administrative law typically combines all three elements of
public law to facilitate cohesion between the exercise of public power
and the public interest. 221 However, in many countries administrative
laws are only enforceable against state actors. 222 In democratic countries
that continue to engage the private sector in the operation and
management of water systems, there is a need for reforms that will hold
223
private actors exercising public power democratically accountable.
In searching for models of administrative law available for
deepening democratic accountability, South Africa again offers a
pragmatic example of an administrative law statute that incorporates
public law principles to protect human rights, including the right 224
to
water, against both state and private entities exercising public power.
South Africa passed the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act of 2000
(PAJA) to give effect to the right to "administrative action that is lawful,
reasonable and procedurally fair," 225 and to promote the obligation to
provide reasons for administrative actions that affect rights under
Section 33 of the Constitution. 226 The principle tenants of the PAJA
require administrators to (1) follow certain procedures when making
decisions; (2) give adequate reasons for decisions upon request; (3)
inform individuals of their rights to review and appeal administrative
decisions; and (4) allow individuals to challenge administrative
actions. 227 Thus, the PAJA elaborates on a bare right to administrative
protections in the Constitution. It explains how officials must proceed in
228
order to give effect to constitutional rights and directives.
220. Id.
221. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy, and a Need for a New
Administrative Law, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 125, 147 (2003).
222. E.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2011) (defining that the
general administrative law statute in the United States only applies to federal
government agencies under the Administrative Procedure Act).
223. See Aman, supranote 221, at 152.
224. See generally Caron Beaton-Wells, Administrative Law in South Africa: No Longer
a "Dismal Science" (Melbourne L. Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 397, 2003),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract -id=1407372 (comparing
South Africa's and Australia's administrative laws and the strengths of the South Africa
model).
225. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 33.
226. Beaton-Wells, supra note 224, at 86-89.
227. IAN CURRIE ET AL., DEPT. OF JUST. & CONST. DEV., ADMINISTRATOR'S GUIDE: THE
PROMOTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE ACT 12 (Greg Moran ed., 2d ed. 2006) (S. Afr.),
available
at
http://www.fs.gov.za/information/documents/legal%20services/admin%
20guide%20prom%20admin%202nd%20edition.pdf.
228. The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, Introduction, DEPT. OF JUST. &
CONST. DEV., http://www.justice.gov.za/paja/abouttintro.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2012)
(S. Afr.); Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 pmbl. (S. Afr.).
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1. Applicability to PrivateActors
An administrative action under the PAJA is "a decision ... that is of
an administrative nature made in terms of an empowering provision...
that is not specifically excluded by the [PAJA] . . . by an organ of the
state . . . that adversely affects rights. 2 29 A decision that is "of an
administrative nature" is one that is carried out as part of official duties
according to laws that allow actors to make decisions. 2 0 "[O]rgan[s] of
[the] state" are defined in South Africa's Constitution as "functionaries
or institutions ... exercising a power or performing a function in terms
of any legislation. 23' This has significant implications for water
privatization because the PAJA can apply to private actors when they
are performing public roles, such as managing water delivery
systems.23 2 A private entity's decision to act or not to act may be
required to adhere to the same procedure and explanation requirements
as public entities. Thus, the PAJA strives to prevent deregulation from
accompanying privatization, allowing the bridge 233
between citizens and
private providers of public goods to remain intact.
2. ProceduralFairness
Procedural fairness under the PAJA means that the process must be
free of bias and partiality, and it must give adversely affected
individuals, or the public generally, a reasonable opportunity to be
heard. 4 To accomplish this objective, the PAJA mandates that those
who will be adversely affected by an administrative action must be
given notice of the pending administrative action and an opportunity to
make arguments.23 5 Individuals must also have access to explanations of
what the proposed action is and why it is being proposed. 6
Additionally, when a decision is reached, administrators must give a
clear reason for the decision as well as notice of the right for review or to
229. CURRIE, supra note 227, at 14.
230. See id. at 16; see also Beaton-Wells, supra note 224, at 94 (the test for
"administrative in nature" depends on the action rather than the who the decision maker
is).
231. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 239.
232. See CURRIE, supra note 227, at 17 (stating that a private company that contracts
with a municipality for the supply of water would be covered by the PAJA).
233. See Aman, supranote 20, at 549-50.
234. CURRIE, supranote 227, at 23-24, 30.
235. See id. at 24-25 (explaining how notice involves more than informing a person).
236. See The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, Reasons, DEP'T OF JUST. & CONST.
DEV., http://www.justice.gov.za/paja/about/reasons.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (S.
Mr.).
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appeal.237 Thus, the PAJA requires transparency of information and
outcomes in the course of public participation in administrative
decisions.
The degree of public participation, however, varies depending on the
circumstances-a person may be entitled to a hearing or merely
permitted to submit a written statement. 238 Administrators have
discretion to allow legal representation in the proceedings, to allow the
right to confront adverse witnesses, and to allow in-person appearances
during the proceeding. 239 But the PAJA also provides that municipalities
must find ways to encourage public participation in government
decisions. 240 Additionally, the government is required to promote
transparency by furnishing information and ensuring it is accessible
and accurate.24 '

3. Reasonable Explanations
Finally, administrators must give adequate, written explanations
for their administrative action upon request, though they are free to
give explanations for all decisions.242 Upon judicial review, the
explanations are judged by their reasonableness considering the
information available at the time the decision was made. 243 The fact that
explanations are not required with a decision threatens the legitimacy
of outcomes because it presents the opportunity for post hoc
rationalizations. 244 Additionally, a requirement that explanations must
be reasonable is likely to lead to highly deferential decisions from courts
upon judicial review.245 Although not decided under the PAJA, Mazibuko
v. City of Johannesburg is indicative of the deferential outcomes of a
"reasonable explanation" requirement. In the context of administrative
decisions affecting fundamental human rights, it is likely preferable
that such explanations of administrative decisions should offer more.
Nevertheless, this arrangement is better than no required explanation
at all. Additionally, explanations must be "satisfactory," meaning that
237. CURRIE, supranote 227, at 25.
238. Id.

239. Id. at 26.
240. MCDONALD & RUITERS, supra note 9, at 64.
241. Id.
242. CURRIE, supra note 227, at 29.
243. Id. at 36.
244. See, e.g., ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 51012 (Westlaw Sch. Advisory Bd. ed., 2d. ed. 2001) (discussing the requirement under the
Administrative Procedure Act that agencies give reasons that are contemporaneous with
the agency's policy decisions).
245. See id. at 512 (using the term "rational agency explanation").
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they must offer details that convey the reasons246for the outcome and
cannot be mere recitations of statutory authority.
Although the PAJA is not perfect, the existence of comprehensive
administrative laws does much to ensure public participation,
transparency, and accountability in government decisions. Equally
important is the applicability of the PAJA to private entities. The PAJA
demonstrates that constitutional and human rights may be better
protected through the process of privatization when government and
private actors are legally bound to follow procedures that foster
democratic accountability.
CONCLUSION

Water is something everyone must have. There are individual and
societal considerations that must be factored into how it is managed,
and that responsibility falls first to states. The recognition of water as a
human right reinforces that responsibility and is a positive step toward
universal access to clean, drinkable water. But a legal framework that
fosters democratic accountability with public law principles must
complement that right.
South Africa is a unique and informative case study for considering
ways to privatize water delivery systems in ways that respect and
secure a human right to water. Recognizing the human right gives
citizens a position from which to demand state accountability for
privatization decisions. Meanwhile the reasonableness approach of
South Africa's Constitutional Court affords the state flexibility in
determining how to take progressive steps toward fulfilling that right
with limited resources. Finally, the PAJA reinforces the right to water
with procedural requirements. Developing administrative laws that
require transparency, public participation, and accountability that
apply to public and private actors will legitimize decisions to privatize,
will better adhere to the concerns of the poor and marginalized groups,
and will give governments flexibility to choose policies that comply with
human rights. South Africa's legal framework offers mechanisms to plug
the democracy drain and may be a useful model for other developing
counties grappling with privatization in human rights interests. By
improving democratic accountability in water services, we will be closer
to reaching universal access to clean water.

246. CURRIE, supra note 227, at 30.

